Methods
The two major tobacco industry document depositories located near Guildford, UK, and in MN, USA, have been previously described. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] In accordance with the 1998 Minnesota tobacco 25 
Limitations
Although the publicly available tobacco documents reviewed for this article represent an invaluable resource, there are several limitations to this work. First, despite extensive online searches of the documents produced by the various tobacco companies in 45 the US litigation, no other investments by BAT in film production were identified and no comparable activity by other tobacco companies was uncovered. The absence of documentary evidence of comparable activity elsewhere by BAT or its competitors could indicate either that none transpired or, alternatively, that 50 no documentary record of such activity was created or remains. The latter possibility has to be considered in light of the documented actions by members of the tobacco industry to conceal information. 10 Second, since the lawsuit from which they were produced was based on the United States market, these publicly 55 available documents likely do not represent a complete set of correspondences and reports relating to Eastern Europe. Third, although the 10 documents we report here are picked from hundreds of thousands of pages, we assert that this does not invalidate our findings. In order for our findings to be invalid-60 ated, other documents would have to directly contradict what we report here. We did not find such documents. Additionally, the isolated communications cited here involve high ranking executives within BAT, who would have the task of developing overarching marketing schemes and who would have the appa-rent authority to authorize any proposed marketing plans. Finally, personal contact was made with a central figure in the relevant documents, Mr Patrick Newman. Mr Newman answered a few initial questions about BAT's involvement prior to ceasing to respond to further questions or requests 70 for additional information.
Smoking in the movies
Promotion of smoking through the movies began when tobacco companies quietly paid Hollywood producers and/or film stars to have cigarette brands appear prominently in films. 11 18 Moreover, cigarette brand appearances are as common in films directed at children as they are for films geared for adults. 19 5 Working behind the scenes Despite regulatory efforts to eliminate product placement in movies, could cigarette manufacturers have devised a scheme enabling them to deny paying product placement fees yet ensure that their cigarettes are prominently featured in a specific film? 10 Yes. The solution: become an investor in the movie business.
Certain BAT documents show that in the late 1990s BAT considered funding the production of a film. The available documents, however, end prior to BAT's final decision, so it is uncertain whether the film ultimately was made and if so, 15 whether it was with BAT's participation. According to the film's producer, the movie was never released and a written request for details of why the film was not released went unanswered by the producer (Personal Communication. Email from Eric LeGresley to Patrick Newman, LIDC. 25 February 2005). 20 Nevertheless, the movie plan was an excellent fit for BAT's agenda for expanding into Eastern Europe. Following the political collapse of the Eastern Bloc, BAT, along with the other transnational tobacco companies moved expeditiously into these newly available markets. 20, 21 It was a crucial time 25 both for governments throughout Eastern Europe and for the cigarette manufacturers. Most socio-economic indicators in Eastern Europe were well below their Western European neighbours, and effective tobacco control was only just emerging. 22 
30
The ending of the cold war and the opening up of Eastern Europe perhaps offered the best political opportunity in a couple of generations to improve the public health situation in the region. However, at the same time governments needed to obtain foreign direct investment, making investment by the 35 tobacco companies attractive. A significant challenge to entering this emerging market, however, was occurring due to a growing international movement to restrict direct tobacco advertising in print and electronic media. Therefore, other promotional options would have to be developed to fuel expansion into 40 the Eastern European market.
BAT documents from 1996 show an interest in using movies for tobacco promotion in several Eastern European countries. For example, a tobacco executive suggested that movies in Hungary could reach a young urban market segment, to 45 which BAT's marketing director, Jimmi Rembiszewski, responded positively for the promotion of BAT's Kent brand. 23 About the same time BAT also considered using movies as the medium in Romania to launch its Lucky Strike brand in that market. 24 
50
Consistent with the identified opportunity that movies offered for cigarette brand promotion in 1997 and 1998, BAT evaluated becoming an investor in a film then bearing the working title 'Aquarius', later called 'Indian Poker'. 25 Patrick Newman, the UK-based founder of the London International 55 Development Corporation, was the film's producer. The film's development and production, like many films, was transnational in nature: despite being filmed primarily in Britain, the film's setting would be in Eastern Europe. So, too, would be the key distribution and promotional campaigns. 26 
60
In return for providing the money to make the film, BAT would not only share in the profits and receive a reduction of British taxes, 27 ,28 but also receive cigarette marketing opportunities:
The plan is for BAT to guarantee the film's budget of £2.25 65 million. In return BAT will receive. . . a range of media and marketing opportunities in 28 target territories in Eastern Europe and former USSR. . .
26
The film's producer also reported that 85% of the anticipated 70 audience would be 'young adults' 26 and that BAT would have 'exclusive rights to position its chosen [cigarette] brand in association with every aspect of the movie exploitation', including launch parties, etc., which were expected to be aired on television. 26 The number of showings of the film was calculated as 75 over 52 000, with each showing including a BAT sponsorship message in addition to the movie. Even the admission tickets were to bear a BAT brand name and logo. 29 But the visible association of BAT cigarettes with the film was not to be limited to post-production activities. BAT cigarettes 80 and brand imagery were to be imbedded in the film itself. Making the initial formal contact with BAT, Patrick Newman writes to BAT's finance director, Keith Dunt, describing the proposed film:
[The movie] is a film noir/classic action adventure movie in 85 which the heroine smokes; it would be very much in her character to smoke Lucky Strike. 30 Stating the obvious, Newman continues:
If we were to secure product placement of the Lucky Strike 90 (sic) or other suitable BAT brand in the film, this would be of significant international benefit to BAT. . . Rembiszewski's 'discrete' strategy for using movies to promote cigarettes is an astute move: make an independent case for profitability flowing from the use of the trademark (as opposed to the product), and do not saturate the film with your product 115 imagery, something that will just draw unwanted attention. This would place BAT's cigarette brand imagery onto screens seen by millions of young people yet would do so in a manner that would, in all likelihood, help the company deflect criticism. In this manner, BAT would at least have a tenable public rela- posed to deliver more of the same to the movie-going public in selected markets: glamorous stars puffing away. That any communications inside BAT exist as of 1998 attesting to this strategy shows that the cigarette companies cannot be relied upon to 5 follow their own voluntary codes designed to regulate cigarette promotion in the movies. Any effective response to the promotional impact of smoking in movies needs to protect impressionable youth from movies depicting smoking. Limiting access of young age groups to sex 10 and violence in film is a longstanding Hollywood practice. The simple and effective national solution, one supported by numerous health groups, is to give a 'Restricted' rating to movies with cigarette smoking, thereby limiting admission to moviegoers of 18 years and older. 33 This would leave tobacco companies free to 15 invest in movies, but not to invest in children.
Lessons for the international regulation of movies
Desirable as national approaches are to reducing tobacco promotion through the movies, in isolation, they will be insuf-20 ficient. The motion picture business is international in production and transnational in distribution as satellites and other broadcast media deliver an increasing amount of movie content to viewers. As BAT's proposed Indian Poker film project demonstrates, in order to be truly effective, international measures will 25 be necessary. For example, additional promotional opportunities for BAT included both a television documentary about the making of the film and the potential to broadcast the film on television once the theatre release was over. 34 Those television broadcasts would, of course, cross national borders into neigh-30 bouring countries leaving it beyond the domestic regulatory reach of individual countries. Moreover, the BAT project planned to have a British financier, British producer, and a British location film shoot. Although produced for Eastern European audiences, it is not readily apparent how an Eastern 35 European country in isolation could adequately safeguard against precisely the manner of tobacco promotion BAT was considering.
The World Health Organization has assigned the promotion of smoking in movies a high priority by designating 'tobacco free 40 film' as the subject of World No Tobacco Day 2003. 35 Thus, there has been an expectation that the WHO-sponsored Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) 36 would deal with the problem. The FCTC is in its early stages, with protocols (ancillary agreements that set out detailed obligations consistent 45 with and in addition to those in the central framework treaty) currently under discussion. Existing language regarding tobacco advertising bans in the current FCTC are adequately broad to permit future protocols to prohibit tobacco promotion through the movies, including the sort of ruse BAT was considering 50 for Eastern Europe. To do so, however, any FCTC protocol relating to tobacco promotion in movies will require astute legal drafting. Although both an industry-wide 2001 international marketing code 17 and the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between 55 the tobacco industry and the majority of the US states 15 bar cigarette advertising in movies, BAT documents show that the company could nevertheless find creative ways around these restrictions. If carried out by the tobacco companies, such actions suggest that FCTC protocols should not only consider 60 the tobacco industry's current means of cigarette promotion through movie product placement, but also future scenarios of the industry's evolving marketing and promotional innovations to use movies to attract young consumers. This requires a change in approach: FCTC protocols should focus primarily on 65 the effects of industry action rather than the precise manner of industry action.
For legal drafting of the FCTC protocols, this can be most readily achieved by setting out what is permitted rather than what is prohibited, thereby reducing opportunities for the cigar-70 ette companies to devise new means to subvert the regulatory intent. Taking this approach is especially important in an international context. With domestic legislation, a country might ban action 'A', leading the tobacco company to undertake action 'B' with the same result. The legislature may then revisit the issue 75 and also ban 'B'. Internationally this approach will be vastly more problematic. For every evasive tact taken but not previously prohibited, the parties to the FCTC protocol would have to get together to amend the international treaty, and then implement that change in their respective domestic laws. This 80 would likely lead to inaction and ineffectualness. In the realm of international tobacco control, where new ground is currently being covered through the FCTC, adopting new approaches is warranted.
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Key points
Internal corporate documents from British American Tobacco (BAT) show that the company evaluated investing in a movie destined for Eastern Europe in than what is prohibited in the area of tobacco and movie, thereby reducing opportunities for the cigarette companies to devise new means to subvert the regulatory intent.
